
| Campo | Valor |
|---|---|
| Formato | Analítico de periódico ou monográfico |
| N.º Sistema | 000043805 |
| Autor | |
| Título | |
| Texto Integral | Versão digital [2,91MB] [Link permanente] |
| Língua | inglês |
| País | União Europeia |
| Local | |
| Editor | |
| Ano | 2006 |
| Colecção | |
| Tipo de Documento | |
| Índice | Contents Executive summary Part I — Current developments and prospects 1. Budgetary developments in the euro area and EU Member States 1.1. Short-term developments and prospects for the budget balance and public debt 1.2. Government revenue and expenditure 1.2.1. The fiscal stance and policy mix in the euro area 1.2.2. The fiscal stance and policy mix at the national level 2. Implementing the Stability and Growth Pact 2.1. Introduction 2.2. The excessive deficit procedure since spring 2005 2.2.1. The surveillance mechanisms in the euro-area countries 2.2.2. The surveillance mechanisms in the non-euro area Member States 3. Overview of the 2005 updates of the stability and convergence programmes 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Medium-term objectives indicated in the Stability and Convergence Programmes 3.3. Growth projections 3.4. Budgetary plans 3.5. Composition of the budgetary adjustment 3.6. Debt projections 4. The long-term sustainability of public finances based on the 2005/06 updates of the stability and convergence programmes 4.1. Introduction 4.2. The approach used to assess the long-term sustainability of public finances 4.3. The assessment of the long-term sustainability of public finances based on the 2005/06 updates 4.3.1. The data used in the analysis 4.3.2. The quantitative indicators. 4.3.3. The qualitative considerations 4.4. Main public finance sustainability challenges in Member States |
| Part II — Evolving budgetary surveillance #1. Codification of the agreement on the SGP reform 1.1. Introduction 1.1.1. The legislative changes to the SGP 1.1.2. The revised Code of Conduct 2. Making the revised Stability and Growth Pact operational – the preventive arm 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Setting the medium-term budgetary objectives 2.2.1. Country-specific MTOs in the current phase 2.2.2. MTOs in perspective: taking into account implicit liabilities 2.3. The adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objectives 2.3.1. The definition of the adjustment path towards the MTOs 2.3.2. Deviations from the adjustment path for the implementation of structural reforms 2.3.3. Implementation of the agreement in the 2005 Stability and Convergence Programmes updates 3. Making the revised Stability and Growth Pact operational – the corrective arm 3.1. Introduction 3.2. The application of the excessive deficit procedure 3.2.1. Preparation of Commission reports in accordance with Article 104(3) 3.2.2. All deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP have been considered excessive 3.2.3. Initial deadlines for the correction of excessive deficits were set taking into account economic circumstances 3.2.4. An obligation of structural efforts, to ensure that excessive deficits are corrected in a permanent way 3.2.5. Improved economic dialogue between the Commission, the Council and the Member States 3.3. The concept of ’effective action’ in the excessive deficit procedure 3.3.1. New definition and role of ’effective action’ in the excessive deficit procedure 3.3.2. A broad assessment of compliance with EDP recommendations | |
| 4. Measurement and statistical issues 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Definition and identification of one-off and temporary measures 4.2.1. One-off and temporary measures in the context of numerical fiscal rules 4.2.2. Recent experience with one-off measures in the EU 4.2.3. Guidance for the identification of one-off and temporary measures 4.2.4. An indicative and open list of one-off and temporary measures 4.2.5. Information requirements on one-off and temporary measures 4.3. The estimation of new and updated budgetary sensitivities and the determination of minimal benchmarks 4.3.1. Updating the estimation of budgetary sensitivities and computing sensitivities for the new Member States 4.3.2. The computation of new values for minimal benchmarks for budget balances 4.4. Recent developments in the governance of budgetary statistics 4.4.1. Statistical governance reform is part of the SGP reform 4.4.2. Legislative changes related to reporting of deficit and debt levels 4.4.3. Progress in the availability of budgetary statistics 4.4.4. Institutional reform 4.4.5. Conclusion 5. New long-term budgetary projections and improvements of the analysis of the long-term sustainability of public finances 5.1. Introduction 5.2. The 2005/06 long-term projections of age-related expenditure for the EU-25 5.3. Improvements of the analysis of the long-term sustainability of public finances | |
| Part III — National numerical fiscal rules and institutions for sound public finances 1. Introduction 2. Rationale for the introduction of numerical fiscal rules and independent institutions at national level 2.1. Introduction 2.2. The deficit bias in perspective 2.3. Reasons for the deficit bias point to the short-term horizon of policy-makers 2.3.1. Explanations for the deficit bias 2.3.2. Recent economic and political developments might have strengthened those elements behind the deficit bias 2.4. How can the deficit bias be addressed? 2.4.1. Numerical fiscal rules 2.4.2. Independent institutions, other than government and Parliament, influencing the conduct of fiscal policy 2.4.3. Concluding remarks 3. Numerical fiscal rules in the 25 EU Member States 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Various types of numerical fiscal rules and their respective properties 3.3. Existing numerical fiscal rules in EU Member States 3.4. Do numerical fiscal rules improve budgetary performance? 3.4.1. Relation between the introduction of numerical fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes 3.4.2. Relation between the share of government finances covered by numerical fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes 3.4.3. Relation between the characteristics and coverage of numerical fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes 3.4.4. Main conclusions from the study | |
| 4. National independent institutions 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Independent institutions can participate in different activities 4.2.1. Institutions operating in the field of ’positive economics’ 4.2.2. Institutions operating in the field of ’normative economics’ issue statements and recommendations on fiscal policy 4.3. Institutions in place in the EU 4.3.1. Institutions in charge of providing forecasts and/or conducting positive analysis on fiscal policy issues 4.3.2. Institutions in charge of issuing normative statements on the conduct of fiscal policies and recommendations 4.4. Link with budgetary outcomes and conclusions from the analysis of the questionnaires 4.4.1. Link with budgetary outcomes 4.4.2. General considerations inspired by the answers to the questionnaires 4.4.3. Main conclusions and findings from the study | |
| Part IV: Fiscal policy in good times 1. Introduction 2. The cyclical behaviour of the fiscal stance 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Prescriptions from theory 2.3. Broad evidence 2.4. The recurrence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy: in search of explanations 3. The stance of fiscal policy in EU countries during good and bad times 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Defining good and bad times 3.2.1. In search of an operational definition 3.2.2. Measurement errors 3.3. The fiscal policy stance in good and bad times: a close look at the EU 3.3.1. Basic evidence 3.3.2. The cyclical behaviour of revenues and expenditures 3.3.3. Ex-ante vs. ex-post assessment of the cycle 3.4. Summary of findings 4. National rules and institutions to prevent pro-cyclical policies in good times 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Fiscal rules 4.2.1. Budget balance and debt rules 4.2.2. Expenditure rules 4.2.3. Revenue rules and rainy-day funds 4.3. National independent institutions 4.4. National fiscal rules and the stance of fiscal policy over the cycle 4.5. Summary of results | |
| Part V — Member State developments 1. Belgium 2. The Czech Republic 3. Denmark 4. Germany 5. Estonia 6. Greece 7. Spain 8. France 9. Ireland 10. Italy 11. Cyprus 12. Latvia 13. Lithuania 14. Luxembourg 15. Hungary 16. Malta 17. Netherlands 18. Austria 19. Poland 20. Portugal 21. Slovenia 22. Slovakia 23. Finland 24. Sweden 25. United Kingdom Part VI — Resource 1. Consolidated version of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 2. Consolidated version of Council Regulation No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 3. Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes 4. Glossary 5. References 6. Useful Internet links Statistical annex | |
| Nível de conjunto | European Economy Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Nº 3 (2006) 459 p. 0379-0991 PP1606/6 |
| Classif.Temática | |
| Assunto | |
| ISBN | 92-79-01233-9 |
| Cota | CIEJD PP1606/6 ISSUE |
| Ligacao | European economy |
| Existências | Ano - 2012 |
| Existências | Ano - 2011 |
| Existências | Ano - 2010 |
| Existências | Ano - 2009 |
| Existências | Ano - 2008 |
| Existências | Ano - 2007 |
| Existências | Ano - 2006 |
| Existências | Ano - 2005 |
| Existências | Ano - 2004 |
| Existências | Ano - 2003 |
| Existências | Ano - 2002 |
| Existências | Ano - 2000 |
| Existências | Ano - 1997 |
| Existências | Ano - 1996 |
| Existências | Ano - 1995 |
| Existências | Ano - 1994 |
| Existências | Ano - 1993 |
| Existências | Ano - 1992 |
| Existências | Ano - 1991 |
| Existências | Ano - 1990 |
| Existências | Ano - 1989 |
| Existências | Ano - 1987 |
| Existências | Ano - 1984 |
| Existências | Ano - 1983 |
| Existências | Ano - 1982 |
| Existências | Ano - 1979 |
| Biblioteca... | Biblioteca CIEJD |
| Código QR |
Siga o CIEJD: